Sovereignty and Security - Australia and the new world disorder  

Sovereignty and Security - Australia and the new world disorder  

Malcolm Turnbull 

1 April 2025 

National Press Club, Canberra

**check against delivery**

In the foreword to the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper I wrote:

“More than ever, Australia must be sovereign, not reliant. We must take responsibility for our own security and prosperity while recognising we are stronger when sharing the burden of leadership with trusted partners and friends.”

In the White Paper we set out five objectives of fundamental importance to Australian security and prosperity:

• Promote an open, inclusive and prosperous Indo Pacific in which the rights of all states are protected

• Deliver more opportunities for our businesses globally and stand against protectionism

• Ensure Australains remains safe, secure and free in the face of threats such as terrorism

• Promote and protect the international rules that support stability and prosperity and enable cooperation to tackle global challenges

• Step up support for a more resilient Pacific and Timor-Leste

In early 2017 we were confident that those goals were shared by the United States. The real agenda of Trump’s first administration had not taken shape, and his  protectionism still seemed more rhetorical than real.

But today, we have a US President who believes ‘tariff’ is the most beautiful word - so the US does not share the second objective at all. 

And the first and third objectives which look to the preservation of an international rules based order are also, plainly, no longer shared by the United States.

Mr Trump has said he will “get Greenland” one way or the other and has repeatedly refused to rule out the possibility of doing so with military force. Greenland is a territory of Denmark, a NATO ally. The Vice President, Mr Vance, has even been to Greenland and said “Our message to Denmark is very simple - you have not done a good job by the people of Greenland.”

As if that were not enough, Mr Trump has described the border between Canada and the United States as “fictional” and declared that Canada has no economic future other than as the 51st state of America.  He has imposed crippling tariffs on Canada, all in breach of the free trade agreement he signed in 2017. 

The former Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau, after speaking to Trump just a few weeks ago, said “What he wants is to see a total collapse of the Canadian economy, because that’ll make it easier to annex us.” Trump has generously said that the Canadians can keep their “beautiful anthem” O Canada but it will of course be the anthem of an American state, and not an independent country. 

There is an eerie resonance between the language Trump uses about Canada and the language Putin uses about Ukraine - the borders are fictional, doesn’t deserve to be a separate country and so forth. 

And then I need not remind you of the extraordinarily shameful way Trump has treated Ukraine. In his endeavour to broker a peace deal, rather than using American might to compel the aggressor, Putin, to come to the table, he has humiliated and knee capped the weaker wronged party - cutting off military aid and intelligence sharing until Zelensky agreed to a ceasefire. 

And if that punching down wasn’t bad enough, he’s has taken the opportunity to demand a huge share of Ukraine’s mineral resources as some kind of compensation for the aid America has already given. 

Simply stated: the United States under President Trump does not share the values we have shared with every single one of his predecessors, Republican and Democrat, for over eighty years. And he does not pretend to share them. This is a feature, not a bug of the Trump administration.

Australian sovereignty, sovereign autonomy, has never been so important. And yet in recent years it has never been so diminished.  

This does not mean that we will not have shared interests with the United States. A key one will be to encourage the US to remain engaged in our region - not as the dominant hegemon as it was thirty years ago, those days are passed, quite a while ago - but as a balancing force to China.

And that is why these dramatic changes in the United States, many of which have been evident in less stark form for years, should not lead us to abandon the ANZUS alliance. We have so much in common, so many interests in common with the United States, even if we don't have as many values as we used to. 

But instead of our defence forces being a useful auxiliary component to support United States operations, almost incapable of acting independently, they need to become a genuine, sovereign force capable of defending Australia, of deterring adversaries without relying on American support. This was a key topic at yesterday’s forum here in this room.

This means we must urgently develop a much larger sovereign defence industry. In other words we need to make much more of our own capabilities, and we’ve got great examples of countries with much smaller GDP’s than ours, are much more self-reliant in terms of military capabilities. 

I regret to say, that while The Pentagon regards the US military industrial base as an essential part of their national security, regrettably our Defence establishment does not feel the same way about the Australian defence sector.  So this will require political leadership. 

And of course this is not helped by the rivers of gold flowing to the UK and US for AUKUS Pillar 1 all of which, which everyone in this town knows, is progressively impoverishing the rest of the Defence Budget.

Peter Dutton recently said we cannot assume the cavalry will always ride over the hill to save us. He is absolutely right. But unfortunately during his time as defence Minister we became even more dependent on that cavalry than ever. 

In other words, instead of our alliance with the US being a means for Australia to support Us primacy, and US goals in the region it should be a means by which we could expect (but not be assured of) American assistance to defend our own country.

In other words, there is one way in which our leaders need to be a little like Donald Trump - they have to put Australia first.

We will need to make it very clear where we differ from the United States whether it is on trade, climate or international law. 

In recent years our influence in the region has been diminished by the perception that we are just a rubber stamp for Washington. I’ve heard this directly from leaders and foreign ministers in the region. AUKUS did not help in that regard as it was seen, in the region, as running back to our former and current imperial masters. 

Today, we need more than ever  to have a distinctly Australian foreign policy, one in which we will on many important issues differ markedly from the United States. 

Of course, and I say this with respect to many fine diplomats in this room, our foreign policy has never been a facsimile of the Americans, but even when we have, independently, come to the same view it has  been easy for others to assume that we were acting under orders. And Gareth Evans spoke very eloquently about that yesterday, and as you know, he doesn’t take orders from anyone. 

We will need to work with other countries to counteract the consequences of the trade war Donald Trump is inflicting on the world - we can build on the model of the Trans Pacific Partnership alive and flourishing without the USA

And we will  need to weigh up, as James Curran reminded us yesterday, of all the benefits we have brought to the American alliance and in the same transactional way Trump treats us, calculate which of those we will withdraw or qualify.

The United States is a friend, but my plea to Australian politicians is get off your knees and stand up for Australia. Be as transactional with America as it is with us. And remember, in the imperial capital they always regard deference as their due. Trying to get into a race of who can do the most sucking up, particularly with Mr Trump, as I know from direct experience, is not the way to advance your interests or your nation's interests. 

Our best asset for the US in strategic terms is our geography - it was in Macarthur’s day and it is today. 

As one example, how do we feel about providing, at our multi billion dollar cost, a base and maintenance facilities for American nuclear submarines in Perth in circumstances where we:

• See massive tariffs imposed on our exports to the US (despite a free trade agreement)

• Pressure to compromise our Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme with the goal of making Australians pay more for medicine

• Interference with our sovereign right to regulate social media platforms

• A global trade war unleashed which could severely damage our economy

• And in all likelihood end up with no submarines - a subject to which I will now turn. 

It is bad enough that the AUKUS project was born in deceit,but none of us will forget Emmanuel Macron’s droll  “I don’t think, I know.”

I’m not going to go into that history today.
There are two observations I want to make about the past.

First the total failure of process in deciding on the AUKUS plan. Conceived in secret, in a small group around the Prime Minister, there was no proper analysis of alternatives. This has been the subject of express, detailed criticism by the influential Congressional Research Service which notes that projects without a rigorous analysis of this kind invariably end in tears. I think all of us know that.

Second, the Labor Party, then in Opposition, signed up to AUKUS on 24 hours notice in a shadow cabinet phone hook up with no papers. Their only concern was not to get wedged as being weak on national security in the lead up to the 2022 election.

Once elected in 2022, the Albanese Government remained on board the AUKUS plan, again they might argue with this, for the same political reasons. 

Neither the Government or the Opposition are confronting the reality of the AUKUS submarine plan, neither are managing the risks responsibly and as a consequence the Australian people are being gravely misled as to the risks.

So let me set out the facts. And first explain two acronyms: SSN stands for Ship Submersible Nuclear and refers to a nuclear powered submarine (sometimes called an attack submarine)  that is not a ballistic submarine with deterrent nuclear missiles called an SSBN which stands for a ballistic nuclear submarine and we are not planning on getting any of those. 

The object of AUKUS Pillar 1 is for Australia to acquire a fleet of nuclear powered submarines. That was the rationale for dumping the Attack Class, although the obvious option of talking to France about naval nuclear propulsion was never taken up. That again has never been explained. 

The long term AUKUS plan was, and remains, to partner with the British to build a new submarine, known as SSN-AUKUS. This was the as yet undesigned successor to Britain’s existing SSN, the Astute Class.

Powerful arguments have been made that even if the SSN-AUKUS were built it would be the wrong boat - too big, too few and too expensive to own. Recently, the UK’s own Infrastructure and Projects Authority has red flagged the program to develop the new nuclear reactor cores for this submarine (and the new SSBN Dreadnought class) as “Successful delivery of the project appears to be unachievable”. The British project is in plenty of trouble. 

However, regardless of its merits, the first  SSN-AUKUS would not be available in the UK until 2039 at the earliest  and assuming parallel production in Adelaide, for Australia in the early 2040s. Given almost all projects of this scale and complexity run over budget and are late, their availability is likely to be delayed.

As the already elderly Collins Class submarines, our current diesel-electric boats, would retire  well before the SSN-AUKUS could start to arrive, there was the need for a submarine to fill the capability gap.

And so it was decided that Australia would acquire two second hand Virginia Class SSNs in each of 2032 and 2035  with 18 to 27 years each of remaining service, with a third, to be new, in 2038, with an expected 33 year service life. If the SSN AUKUS was delayed there was the option to acquire two additional Virginias to a total of five.

At the same time Australia is providing  at its own massive cost a base and maintenance facilities for nuclear submarines at HMAS Stirling in Perth. It is planned to rotate up to four USN Virginias (and one RN Astute Class submarine) out of Stirling from 2027 and to perform basic in-water maintenance of the kind currently provided to the USN at Guam. 

Australia is also providing an additional  $US3 billion to the United States Government, you saw Richard Marles make the US$500 million payment recently, shortly before the steel tariffs were imposed, to support their submarine industrial base and the same amount to the UK to support their industrial base.

So just looking at the US - look at the deal from their point of view. This is when people say will Donald Trump like the AUKUS deal? 

Why wouldn’t you?

They’re getting a brand new submarine base and maintenance centre for their nuclear powered submarines in Perth. And they are getting $US3 billion. 

Furthermore bright young Australian sailors are training to serve on their nuclear submarines and are already being peppered through the ranks of the USN. And according to Joe Coutrney, the congressman who represents the district of Groton in congress, they're doing really well and topping the class so we have some of the best and brightest of our sailors serving in American submarines. 

But will we ever get them? 

In truth, in my view, there is very little prospect of us ever receiving them. 

The Virginia class submarines are the most valuable, and survivable, assets in the US Navy. 

And the USN does not have enough of them. Right now the US Navy has 49 SSNs including 23 very old Los Angeles Class and two older SeaWolf Class boats all due to retire in the normal course of events by 2030. 

The older boats are retiring faster than they can be replaced. 

Only 2 ½ years ago the incoming Chief of the Navy admiral Lisa Franchetti said the Navy aimed to lift production to 1.4 per year by 2023, 1.5 by 2024 reaching 2.0 by 2028 - which is the level the USN says it needs to meet its own needs.

The average rate for the last three years has not budged - it remains at 1.2. As of 11 March 2025 the US Navy says the production rate is 1.1 boats per year. And from next year there will be increased pressure from the need to build the new SSBNs - the Columbia Class each of which is about 2.5 times the size of a Virginia.

The goal is to complete 2 Virginias with an additional payload module (VPM) and from 2029 one Columbia each year. The two larger Viriginias are 25% bigger than those without and so when added to the much larger Columbia SSBN this effectively means the submarine industrial base has to quintuple its rate of submarine production by 2028 compared to what it built in 2011. There is no evidence to date  that it will do so. 

The upshot will be that by 2032 the USN will certainly have much fewer SSNs than it does today and is likely to have a fleet of only 32 boats. On the most optimistic view, the USN in 2032 will be at least twenty five SSNs short of the 66 boats which is their goal.

At the same time the inadequacies in the submarine industrial base mean that about ⅓ of the fleet is currently in, or awaiting, maintenance - this has risen form 21% of the force in 2012 to 33% as of FY 2023.

They are very upfront about it, you can read all about it in submissions to the US cogress. 

These problems with the US submarine industrial base have been evident for some years and despite more than $US9  billions of dollars of additional funding from 2018 have not materially improved.
There are comprehensive reports that set all this out. I mentioned the Congressional Research Service, and the Congressional Budget Office also does a great job. The United Sates congress is far better informed about AUKUS than the Australian Parliament.

This is no doubt why the Congress made the transfer of any Virginia Class submarines to Australia conditional on the President certifying 270 days before such transfer that, among other things, the transfer would not degrade the undersea capabilities of the USN and that the US submarine industrial base had the capacity to supply both the needs of the USN and Australia. 

As Dennis Richardson noted yesterday at the forum, the President also has to certify that the Australian Government has the capacity to receive and manage the nuclear submarines - in other words the risk of non-delivery is not solely limited to American circumstances. 

So in 2031, the next President after Mr Trump, will be faced with a Navy short of SSNs and a threat from the Chinese Navy likely to be greater than it is today. At the same time vulnerable surface ships will have become even more vulnerable. So the relative value of submarines has increased. Whether they will become more vulnerable too is another issue. 

So do we really expect in those circumstances the President would give the certification that the USN does not need three of its most valuable and survivable assets? The CBO estimates that depending on whether Australia acquired 3 or 5 Virginias, the loss to the USN would range from 65 operational years to 102 operational years between 2032 to 2060.

However even if you do not, believe the risk of getting no subs is very high, there is plainly a risk. It was contemplated by the parties and reflected in the legislation. It is part of the deal. 

So if in 2031 or 2032 the President were to decide their Navy would get preference over ours (in the great race of life always back self interest because you know it's trying) then we could not say we were let down, or that the US had reneged. The risk of non delivery was assumed by Australia’s government with their eyes wide open.

But this risk is unacknowledged by either the Government or the Opposition. Neither of them have any plan to take account of it. 

In other words there is no recognition of the very high risk that in the next decade and much of the one after, Australia will have no submarines at  all.

So speculating as to whether Donald Trump likes AUKUS or not is pointless. The critical decision will be taken by his successor. And that successor, no matter how many koalas on the mantelpiece, will act in the interest of the US Navy. 

No matter how much sucking up goes on, none of us are voting in their elections. Be pragmatic about it. 

So what do we do if we have no submarines?  

And here let me take head on the point attributed to Dennis Richardson yesterday, which Dennis feels was not quite accurate. But I will deal with what was attributed to Dennis without verballing him. It was attributed to him that it was unhelpful of me to persistently ask this difficult question. It was reported that he was suggesting that merely by asking the question it made the Virginias less likely to appear.

That is like saying the little boy who pointed out the Emperor had no clothes was responsible for the emperor catching a cold.

 The availability of Virginias will depend on the subjective decision of the President of the day and will be influenced by many factors almost all of which are out of Australia’s control - the production rate of Virginias, the size of the USN submarine fleet, the nature of the PLAN threat, the perceived need for submarines  and so on. 

So those who say we should not ask the question are saying we should do nothing to plan how to respond to a clear, known and foreseeable risk whose chances of arising are, for the reasons I have laid out, increasing. 

The Americans however do have a Plan B. And from their point of view it is entirely consistent with AUKUS. 

This Plan Is one where Australia has no submarines at all and instead purchases other long range strike capabilities, drones, missiles and even the B21 Stealth  bomber. As for submarines the USN would base a fleet of SSNs in Perth and (hopefully) provide us with the submarine protection we could no longer do for ourselves.

This option is set out in some detail in the Congressional Research Service’s lengthy report on AUKUS Pillar 1.

But even if we were to go down that route we can't just wait until 2032 - we will have to start making plans and acquisitions now. 

On the other hand, if we do not want to end up with no submarines, for at least a decade or more at least, then we need a plan to secure some. Yesterday, RADM Peter Briggs made a very, I thought, compelling submission about these issues. Former submariner of course, and he advocated that we should go back to France to get the rights to build a fleet of Suffren Class nuclear powered submarines which he argues are more suitable for Australia than either the larger Virginias or SSN-AUKUS. The Suffren was the nuclear boat on which the Attack class was based.

This would be very hard to achieve. But it is at least a plan.

If that could not be done, then we would have to consider whether a class of diesel/electric submarines would be better than no submarines - there are several options there. 

The most urgent thing we need is an honest conversation about this issue. I have no confidence that the Australian Navy or the Department of Defence will engage in this unless they are directed to do so by Government. 

Whichever government is returned it should do so. 

Three years ago, I gave advice to the incoming government to be totally transparent, put all the cards on the table, set out what the realistic options are to address the capability gap, how much they will cost and at what risk, and I’m sorry they chose not to do that.  

Truth and transparency build trust. At the moment, we’ve not neither on this issue. 

Three years on, the consequences of not doing that are all too evident.

If the big parties won’t face reality then it may be that Australians will need the cross bench, assuming they have the balance of power, to demand that there be a thorough and urgent assessment of the state of the AUKUS submarine project, a rigorous analysis of the risks and a clear assessment of the measures and alternative options that are available to address those risks. 

Hope is not a strategy, it is better described as “danger’s comforter” a solace for those who are already lost.

We do need a Plan B and not one where the B stands for Blindness - as in wilful blindness.